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Abstract 
Correspondence studies of labour market discrimination find that minorities, which in general suffer 
disadvantage, are sometimes preferred in a choice against members of the majority. This outcome has 
been observed in several studies of ethnic or nationality-based discrimination, but also in studies 
focusing on other characteristics, such as unemployment and being overweight. However, it is generally 
not explained and dismissed as noise. In this paper we challenge this understanding, and, using meta-
analytical techniques, we show that instances of minority preference are not randomly distributed. We 
also show that they are more frequent for groups which overall suffer stronger discrimination and for 
high skilled professionals. We reason that this result may be explained with the fact that groups that 
suffer discrimination have fewer alternatives in the labour market and this makes them more attractive 
for jobs of sub-standard quality and for jobs in which turnover costs are high (e.g. high skilled 
professionals). We conclude by arguing that since tests in which the minority candidate is preferred are 
not randomly distributed, future research should study the determinants of minority preference in a more 
systematic manner.  
 
Acknowledgments 
We thank Dorian Koller for excellent research assistance, Damaris Rose and Fabienne Liechti for 
comments. This research was conducted within the framework of the nccr-on the move (project 7), 
which is financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation.  
Keywords: correspondence testing; discrimination; minority; hiring; employers 
 
Contacts 
a) Giuliano Bonoli, University of Lausanne, Bâtiment IDHEAP, Rue de la Mouline 28, 1015 Lausanne, 
Email: giuliano.bonoli@unil.ch. 
b) Flavia Fossati, University of Lausanne, Bâtiment IDHEAP, Rue de la Mouline 28, 1015 Lausanne, 
Email: flavia.fossati@unil.ch, ORCID ID: 0000-0002-9218-5422. 
 
Biographical notes 
Giuliano Bonoli is Professor of social policy at the Swiss graduate school for public administration at 
the University of Lausanne. His work has focused on pension reform, labour market and family 
polices, with particular attention paid to the politics of welfare state transformation. He has published 
some fifty articles and chapters in edited books, as well as a few books. He is the author of “The 
origins of active social policy. Active labour market policy and childcare in a comparative 
perspective”, (Oxford University Press, 2013). 
 
Flavia Fossati is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Lausanne. Her research interests include 
labour market, education and migration policy, hiring discrimination, comparative politics and welfare 
2 
 
state research. Her work has been published among others in Socio-Economic Review, International 
Migration Review and European Sociological Review. 
1) Introduction 
Studies on labour market discrimination sometimes produce puzzling results. In some instances, 
applicants who belong to groups that are generally discriminated against are preferred to candidates who 
are not expected to face discrimination. This applies to many studies on ethnic discrimination, which 
find that sometimes, in individual tests of pairs of applications, an employer may prefer the ethnic 
minority applicant to the majority candidate. More rarely, but in the context of an overall very small 
number of studies, this phenomenon has been observed also in relation to other factors known to elicit 
discrimination, such as long-term unemployment or physical appearance. In general, all these studies 
dismiss this counterintuitive finding as ‘noise’, or as a random component in hiring decisions. We 
believe that it can be explained.  
Theoretically, there are reasons to prefer a candidate who belongs to a group that is known to be 
discriminated against in the overall labour market. In fact, such candidates have fewer alternatives, thus, 
all else equal, these candidates can be expected to be more loyal, more tractable, and possibly more 
productive at any given wage level, as will be shown in the theory section below. As a result, in some 
instances, employers may rationally prefer a candidate belonging to a group that is discriminated against 
to one who is not. In the following discussion, for the sake of simplicity, we refer to candidates belonging 
to groups that are discriminated against as ‘minority candidates’ and to those belonging to groups who 
are not discriminated against as ‘majority candidates’. In the context of correspondence studies, minority 
preference refers to those (rare) instances in which a minority candidate is preferred over a majority 
candidate.  
We hypothesise that individual instances of minority preference will be more prevalent in two segments 
of the labour market. First, we expect employers to prefer minority candidates when hiring for 
particularly unattractive positions, which tend to be avoided by those who have alternatives. These can 
be low quality, low status, and low paid jobs. Second, we expect employers to prefer minority candidates 
for positions for which turnover costs are high. These could be mid- to high-skilled positions which 
require a big investment on the employer`s side, for instance in terms of in-firm training (e.g. managers, 
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IT-professionals, and accountants), or jobs in sectors where there is labour shortage and for which firms 
have difficulties finding suitable applicants. In these cases, hiring a minority candidate could be 
associated with a lower turnover risk. In both instances, what makes a minority candidate attractive is 
the fact that, relative to majority candidates, they (are expected to) have fewer alternatives in the labour 
market.  
In this paper, we first consider the mechanisms that can explain the preference given to a minority 
against a majority candidate on a theoretical level. To do this, we rely on both qualitative and quantitative 
literature on labour market discrimination and human resources management studies, and particularly 
on the literature about the determinants of turnover intentions. In the empirical section, using meta-
analytical techniques, we attempt to identify patterns in the occurrence of instances of minority 
preference. For our meta-analysis we use a corpus of 151 studies on ethnic discrimination in the labour 
market that provide information on the three different outcomes: only the majority candidate, only the 
minority candidate, or both are invited. Within this corpus we were able to identify 139 usable estimates 
of discrimination (an estimate concerns a group of individual tests performed for a given occupation). 
We found instances of minority preference in 96 of the 139 estimates (or 69%). The proportion of 
individual tests in which the minority candidate is the only one to be invited ranges from 0% to 42%, 
with an average of 8%. 
 
2) Explaining employers` preferences for hiring minority workers 
How do we explain individual instances of minority preference in correspondence studies? In the 
literature, they are generally considered to be noise. Most studies calculate a net discrimination rate, 
whereby the number of tests in which only the minority candidate is invited is subtracted from the 
number of tests in which only the majority candidate is invited. As a result, the information concerning 
                                                          
1 The curvilinear relationship could be replicated also with a bigger sample of 29 studies that consider a total of 
249 estimates of disadvantage (see Figure S1 in the supplementary material). However, in these 14 additional 
studies, besides different occupations job related characteristics such as skill level, firm size, sector of occupation, 
are included as well.    
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the instances of minority preference is lost. In other words, what is usually considered is only the 
difference between majority and minority preference. Thus, very different combinations of call-back 
rates can produce exactly the same net discrimination rate. For example, a net discrimination rate of 0 
can be obtained when both candidates are invited in all tests but also when only the majority candidate 
is invited in 50% of the test and only the minority candidate is invited in the remaining 50% of the tests. 
This is obviously an extreme case, but it illustrates that focusing on net discrimination only may be 
misleading2.  
As noted by Heckman and Siegelman (1993: 198), this implies that ‘the proportion of trials in which 
blacks [minority] are hired and whites [majority] are not, constitutes a benchmark measure for 
“randomness” in employment decisions’. This ‘randomness’ can have different causes, such as a mistake 
by the experimenter, the application from the majority candidate is lost or arrives when the employer 
has already identified enough candidates.  
In contrast, we believe that there are powerful theoretical reasons why an employer may intentionally 
prefer a minority candidate to a majority candidate. What makes the minority candidate attractive is 
precisely the fact that he or she is discriminated against and, if hired, will have fewer alternatives than 
a majority candidate. This quality is likely to be relevant in contexts in which hiring is potentially 
difficult. More specifically, we can identify two situations in which we expect minority preference to be 
more widespread: low desirability jobs avoid; and jobs where employers face high turnover costs. 
 
2.1) Recruiting for undesirable jobs 
A vast literature has shown that employers target disadvantaged workers for undesirable jobs (Faist 
1994: 445; Tilly and Moss, 2001: 153; Shih, 2002; Waldinger and Lichter, 2003; Pager et al 2009; 
Hasluck, 2011; Friberg, 2012: 1924). At the macro level, research on labour market segmentation has 
                                                          
2 The net discrimination rate is only one of the different methods used to report findings of correspondence tests. 
However, this problem applies to all methods that are usually applied, such as call back rates by ethnicity or odds 
ratios. In either case, the information on the proportion of individual paired tests in which only the minority 
candidate is invited is lost and thus remains unexplained in the quantitative literature. 
5 
 
pointed out that disadvantaged groups, defined most often in terms of ethnicity, tend to get trapped in 
lower labour market segments. This phenomenon has first been theorised by US scholars in the 1970s 
(see e.g. Reich, Gordon and Edwards 1973; Piore 1979). They argued that ethnic minority workers were 
overrepresented in a secondary or lower labour market segment because employers could not rely on 
native workers to fill vacancies for undesirable jobs. Piore (1979: 15) talks of ‘occupations rejected by 
indigenous workers (…) typically such jobs offer low pay, poor working conditions, little security and 
inferior social status’. These arguments have found confirmation in micro-level studies- Employers 
recruiting for badly paid jobs have sometimes been found to prefer minority candidates. Moss and Tilly 
(2001: 153) report that ‘(…) at business where managers praised Latinos, Asians, immigrants or African 
Americans, average wages fell markedly below the sample’s overall average’. Pager et al. (2009: 790-
791) found that on occasions minority applicants were offered lower paying and lower skilled jobs than 
the one they had applied for. 
Reasons given for preferring minority workers are generally related to the fact that they have fewer 
alternatives in the labour market than natives. Among other things, these results in higher levels of 
tractability, i.e., the fact of being more inclined to uncritically accept management’s requests. Studies 
of low skill employment have shown that tractability (often expressed in terms of ‘motivation’) is a 
highly sought-after quality in the low skill segment of the labour market (Moss and Tilly 2001, Zamudio 
and Lichter 2008; Bonoli and Hinrichs 2012, Friberg 2012, Raikes and Davies 2015).  
Ethnicity-based preferences for candidates are complex, and are often structured as hierarchies 
(Haagendorn 1993; 1995). The rank ordering of ethnic groups, however, can vary depending on the 
labour market segment. In a Swiss study on recruitment in the hotel sector, Auer et al (2018) found that 
positions at different skill levels generated different nationality-based rankings in employers’ 
preferences. For mid-skilled positions (i.e. receptionists), Swiss candidates were very clearly preferred 
to foreigners. For low skilled positions (room cleaner) instead, foreigners were ranked similarly to 
Swiss.  
This preference for immigrants sometimes translates into ethnic niches in specific industries. This is the 
case for example in the fishing industry in Norway, where employers actively recruit eastern European 
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rather than Norwegian workers, because these are more likely to accept the harsh conditions that 
characterise this profession. Interestingly, more recently arrived immigrants are found to be preferred to 
those who came in the past, at least if they stem from the European Union (Friberg and Midtbøen 2018). 
Based on this evidence, we hypotheses that preferences towards specific groups of minority workers 
should correlate with the level of discrimination they face. 
 
The idea that employers may intentionally prefer a minority over a majority candidate is often found in 
the qualitative literature on ethnic-based labour market discrimination. However, very few attempts have 
been made to test this idea in a quantitative study (Auer et al. 2018 is an exception). We argue that these 
candidates are preferred because they suffer discrimination and thus are less likely to change job once 
they found a position.  
 
2.2) Minimising turnover intentions 
Besides having to recruit for low desirability jobs, there are other reasons to prefer a candidate who, if 
hired, would have few employment alternatives. Firms have difficulties recruiting and keeping skilled 
staff in many specialised occupations. In this case, recruiting candidates with a migration background 
may be a strategy to minimise turnover intentions. 
The literature on human resources management has analysed the process of deciding to quit one’s 
employer. One of the most widely used models was developed Meyer and Allen (1991: 71) and argues 
that various factors impact on the decision to leave a firm, including affective and normative factors. 
One important element in the decision is the value of the perceived employment alternatives, which is 
part of what they call ‘continuance commitment’.3 In empirical studies, perceived employment 
alternatives are generally measured with survey items eliciting an opinion on how easy it would be for 
a respondent to find employment of equal or better quality. These items tend to be positively correlated 
                                                          
3 ‘Continuance commitment’ refers to a rational calculus of the costs associated with quitting a job. It depends essentially on 
investments and alternatives (Meyer and Allen 1991: 71) 
7 
 
to turnover intentions and, in longitudinal studies, to a higher probability of quitting at a subsequent time 
(Rusbult and Farrel 1983; Vandenberghe 2015). The relevance of perceived employment alternatives as 
a determinant of turnover intentions and decisions has also been confirmed in meta-analyses. A better 
assessment of one’s alternatives is associated with a stronger inclination to quit, even though the strength 
of the effect varies (Griffeth et al 2000; Meyer et al. 2002; Jiang et al. 2012).  
We make the plausible assumption that the perception of fewer employment alternatives is associated 
with a lower likelihood to quit an employer. However, this assumption is not sufficient. We also need 
to assume that being exposed to discrimination reduces perceived employment alternatives. 
Unfortunately, the question of what are the determinants of perceived employment alternatives has not 
received much attention in the human resources literature, and we were not able to find studies focusing 
specifically on this question. However, for our argument, it is essential to know what the determinants 
of perceived employment alternatives are and if the fact of being exposed to labour market 
discrimination is among them. To do this we use questions on perceived employment alternatives that 
are available in the European Social Survey (ESS) round 5 for the year 2010.4 By means of multivariate 
analyses we identify a relatively strong negative correlation between a subjective feeling of being 
discriminated against and perceived employment alternatives.5 The correlation is robust and holds when 
using a range of controls that impact on perceived employment alternatives (such as age, level of 
education, nationality; details on the operationalisation and the models are shown in appendix Tables 
A1 and A2). Thus, our assumption that individuals who suffer discrimination believe that they have 
fewer alternatives than those who do not, is not only theoretically plausible, but is confirmed by this 
empirical evidence.  
 
                                                          
4 The same analyses were replicated for round 2 for the year 2004 and yield similar results. 
5 Perceived employment alternatives were measured by the question ‘How difficult or easy would it be for you to get a similar 
or better job with another employer if you had to leave your current job’. Subjective discrimination with the question: ‘Would 
you describe yourself as being a member of a group that is discriminated against in this country?’ 
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2.3) Lack of alternatives as a positive feature 
The lack of alternatives may make candidates attractive because they are more likely to accept 
undesirable working conditions and less likely to quit. In addition, ‘efficiency wage’ theory suggests 
that candidates with fewer alternatives are likely to be more productive at any given wage level. This 
expectation is based on the observation that labour contracts are imperfect, and employees have some 
discretion regarding their level of commitment. They can be highly motivated or can withhold effort 
(i.e., shirk) (Offe and Hinrichs 1985). To limit this phenomenon, employers can decide to pay wages 
that are higher than market clearing ones (so-called efficiency wages), so that if caught shirking and 
dismissed, an employee will be left with a wage loss, even under full employment (Shapiro and Stiglitz 
1984). For discriminated workers, however, there is no need to pay wages above market level because 
they have few alternatives to their present job. If caught shirking and dismissed, they face the risk of 
prolonged unemployment. The consequence is that with for minority workers the efficiency wage is 
likely to be below the market clearing rate, which makes them attractive for employers.6  
Our theoretical model of minority preference requires some further specifications. First, it should be 
made clear that only candidates who lack alternatives due to reasons that are unrelated to their 
productivity, like discrimination, are expected to be attractive for employers. Instead, for candidates 
who lack alternatives because they are not productive the mechanisms we discuss here is irrelevant. 
Second, we do not expect all employers to prefer minority candidates. If this were the case, 
discrimination would be a time-limited phenomenon for any given group. As employers recognise the 
attractiveness of candidates who have few alternatives, they would start to prefer them, and 
discrimination should decline/disappear. In reality, this does not happen. As recently shown in relation 
to African-Americans in the US, labour market discrimination can be a very persistent trend (Quillian 
et al 2017).  
Labour market discrimination is arguably a very complex phenomenon, driven by rational 
considerations based on statistical reasoning but also by psychological mechanisms such as stereotypes 
                                                          
6 This hypothesis was suggested to us by Tobias Müller. 
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and prejudice (Darity and Mason 1998). Our model considers only the first mechanism. The fact that 
not all employers behave as predicted by statistical discrimination theory can be explained with 
reference to other factors that contribute to the persistence of discrimination, like taste-based 
discrimination. Moreover, not all employers may be interested in hiring workers with few alternatives. 
For example, firms who can offer attractive working conditions may be less in need of this strategy. 
Finally, even within a statistical discrimination framework, employers who recognise the advantage of 
hiring workers who are unlikely to leave may still avoid minority candidates if they believe that the 
negative features associated with minority status (e.g. low productivity) outweigh this advantage.   
Finally, we would like to stress that the mechanism that we want to study has been observed mostly in 
relation to discrimination based on ethnicity. There are however a few studies on other forms of 
discrimination whose results that are entirely compatible with this understanding of the way recruitment 
works. With respect to obesity, Rooth (2012) finds that obese candidates are generally discriminated 
against. All else equal, an obese-looking candidate has a lower chance to be invited for a job interview. 
For women, the difference between obese and normal weight candidates equals 8 percentage points. 
Intriguingly, in the case of nurses the opposite happened. For both men and women, there were more 
instances in which the obese-looking candidate was invited than cases in which the normal weight 
applicant was called back. Hiring an obese nurse may be advantageous for an employer because the 
supply is scarce and employers may want to ensure reducing turnover risk. Oberholzer-Gee (2006: 35) 
surveyed employers and found that given the choice between an employed and an unemployed candidate 
(for 12 months) 16.8 of his sample of 766 employers prefer the unemployed candidate (against 10.3% 
for the employed candidate).  
To sum up, we can say that there are both theoretical reasons and scattered empirical evidence suggesting 
that one or several mechanisms might be at play whereby candidates who are discriminated against 
become more attractive for some employers. Following from this observation, we can then formulate 
the hypothesis that minority preference will be positively correlated to gross discrimination. In other 
words, the more a group is discriminated against, the more likely we are to find instances of minority 
preference, i.e. situations in which only the minority candidate is called back.  
10 
 
Next, we subject this hypothesis to a more systematic test based on meta-analytical techniques.  
3) Methodology 
In order to test our hypothesis, we rely on results from the empirical literature on discrimination, and 
particularly on correspondence testing. Correspondence testing is the standard method used to study 
discrimination in the labour market. In the typical set up, fictitious pairs of CVs are sent to real job 
openings. The CVs are identical (or equivalent) in every respect except in the feature that is suspected 
to be responsible for discrimination. The researchers then observe who is invited for a job interview. 
Most studies present the results in terms of call back rates for the different subgroups (for an overview 
see Riach and Rich, 2002; Rich, 2014; Bertrand and Duflo, 2017; Zschrint and Ruedin, 2016; Quillian 
et al 2017).  
As mentioned above, the number of individual tests in which only the minority candidate is invited are 
typically subtracted from those in which the majority applicant is the only one getting a call-back. This 
procedure de facto considers instances of minority preference as noise or, as Heckman and Siegelman 
(1993) put is an element of ‘randomness’ in employment decisions.  
If this view is correct, then instances of minority preference should be randomly distributed across 
studies using the correspondence test method. If, however, the mechanism we hypotheses exists, there 
should be a positive correlation between the gross discrimination rate (i.e. the proportion of tests in 
which only the majority candidate is called back) and the minority preference rate (i.e. the proportion of 
tests in which only the minority candidate is called back). Remember that our hypothesis implies that 
the more a group is discriminated against, the more it becomes attractive for employers preferring 
employees who have few alternatives. 
We expect the relationship between gross discrimination and minority preference to be positive but not 
linear. In fact, since we are working with rates (percentages), there is a ceiling effect. Basically, the sum 
of the gross discrimination rate, the minority preference rate and the equal treatment rate cannot exceed 
100. As a result, we expect the relationship to have a quadratic rather than a linear shape. Figure 1 shows 
what we expect to find if our hypothesis is correct. Profiles that are not discriminated against are also 
11 
 
rarely preferred for jobs in which having few alternatives is an advantage. Then, as gross discrimination 
increases (majority preferred) minority preference also increases, up to a point. When both rates are 




Our unit of analysis are estimates of discrimination, which are used in correspondence studies. 
Typically, correspondence studies provide overall results, and then breakdowns by job type, economic 
sector or nationality of the applicant. Our unit of analysis is the result for these different sub-groups 
within studies. We decided to use estimates of discrimination as unit of analysis (rather than whole 
studies) because the sort of effect we hypothesise may play out differently across labour market 
segments and ethnic groups. Studies are sometimes rather heterogeneous in both respects, and this may 
result in the putative effect to be diluted and invisible. Estimates of discrimination are sub-units of 
studies, and we take this into account by using multilevel modelling. Note that this is standard practice 
in meta-analyses of correspondence studies (see e.g. Zschirnt and Ruedin 2016; Quillian et al 2017).  
 
4) Data 
We constructed a dataset containing results of correspondence studies. For our analyses, we focus 
essentially on two variables: the gross discrimination rate and the minority preference rate. The former 
refers to the percentage of valid applications7 in which only the majority candidate is invited, the latter 
to the proportion in which only the minority candidate is called back. 
 
                                                          
7 Valid applications equal the number of total callbacks, i.e where both, or either the majority or the minority 
candidate were invited for a job interview. Thus, the only cases that are excluded are the instances where neither 













To build our dataset we relied on existing meta-analyses of discrimination in hiring using the studies by 
Riach and Rich (2002), Rich (2014), Zschirnt and Ruedin (2015), and Berntrand and Duflo (2017). We 
compiled a dataset that in a first step includes the results of all written correspondence testing8 that 
analyse the labour market access of ethnic or national minority candidates in different occupations, for 
different skill levels, in different regions, etc.. We include only studies that provide the information on 
raw call-back rates for both majority and minority applicants to be able to compare the results across the 
different studies in a meaningful way. In other words, we refrained from including papers that merely 
provide estimations or coefficients as these are difficult to compare. Overall, we retained 29 of 54 
available studies9 (see table A1-A4 in the appendix for a complete list).  
However, because the classifications in terms of job characteristics are very heterogeneous we re-run 
all the analyses also on a smaller subset of studies that distinguish among minority and majority 
candidates but for specific occupations (rather than one of the other characteristics e.g., skill levels, 
unemployment levels, geographical region). This further reduces the number of available studies to 15 
and the number of discrimination estimates to 139. As the results for both samples are similar, we present 
the estimations of what we believe to be a more homogenous and thus appropriate sample to test our 
hypotheses10.  
 
                                                          
8 We did not include audit studies working with telephone or in person applications, survey or other types of experiments. We 
also excluded studies that do not analyse labour market outcomes (i.e., housing market, etc.). 
9 We also exclude the 15 additional studies working with other methods than written correspondence testing.  




Figure 2 shows the relationship between the gross discrimination rate, i.e. the proportion of cases in 
which only the majority candidate gets a call back (gross discrimination), and the minority preference 
rate, i.e. the proportion of tests in which only the minority candidate gets a call back. As expected, the 
relationship is curvilinear. This finding is compatible with our understanding that groups that are 
discriminated against become more attractive for some employers, possibly exactly because they are 




The curve fit is statistically significant, as can be seen in Table 1, which presents the results of various 
multivariate models. Model 1 contains only the gross discrimination rate (simple and squared) as 
independent variables. Our understanding is that minority preference will be most prevalent in low 
desirability jobs and in occupations in which turnover costs are high. For this reason, in Models 2 and 
3 we consider the impact of job characteristics on the minority preference rate. Model 2 includes an 
occupational prestige score as calculated by Hout et al. (2010) for the 2010 Census. We would expect 





In Model 3 we include dummy variables for the occupation on the basis of the ISCO classification11. 
Unfortunately, the information provided in the studies we reviewed does not allow using a more fine-
                                                          
11 See also Figure S2 in the supplementary material. 
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grained classification than ISCO’s major groups (one-digit ISCO-88 classification). However, in 
relation to our research question, the trend emerging from the data is rather clear. Minority preference 
occurs most frequently in high skill professions (managers and professionals), and less so in all other 
occupations. It is important to underline that this finding does not equate to saying that high skilled 
minority applicants are less discriminated against. Instead what we show is that they are more often 
preferred to their majority competitor. Lower discrimination against high skill individuals because they 
can produce documented qualifications (e.g. diplomas, work experience) is not a sufficient explanation 
for this finding, as it fails to account for why, in these instances, the majority candidate is not invited. 
This result is only partially in line with our expectations. We would have expected a U-shaped 
relationship between the skill level of a job and preference for minority candidates, which, according to 
our model should be strongest in low desirability (i.e., low skill) jobs and as in jobs with high turnover 
costs (i.e., high skilled occupations). Instead, we find a stronger likelihood of minority preference only 
among the high skilled.  
 
6) Discussion 
Our analysis shows that instances of minority preference are not randomly distributed across estimates 
of discrimination. Instead, their occurrence is related to the gross discrimination rate in a curvilinear 
way, as we hypothesised. The curvilinear relationship between gross discrimination and the minority 
preference rate is robust, as it remains statistically significant with different model specifications. We 
believe that this relationship reflects the fact that workers who are discriminated against have fewer 
alternatives on the job market and that this makes them attractive to some employers12. Our results 
                                                          
12 As indicated by one anonymous reviewer, the curvilinear relationship could also be driven by an unobserved variable that 
impacts on the proportion of tests in which both candidates are invited. This variable could be for example the total number of 
applications received for an opening. When there are few candidates overall, employers will tend to invite everyone, whereas 
when there are many candidates, they might be more selective and let both discrimination and noise (which determines minority 
preference) play a bigger role, hence the positive correlation. Since we do not have information on the total number of applicants 
we cannot rule out this alternative explanation. However this view is incompatible with the finding that minority preference is 
more prevalent among high skilled professionals. In fact, it seems reasonable to assume that there are fewer candidates for high 
skill than for low skill jobs, so that if the effect we see were driven by varying numbers of applications, we should see less 
gross discrimination and less minority preference of high skilled vacancies, i.e. the opposite of what we see.   
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suggest that this effect concerns mostly the high skilled segment of the labour market. This is somewhat 
surprising because in the qualitative literature a preference for minority candidates has been 
hypothesised and observed more frequently in relation to low skilled, undesirable jobs that majority 
candidates tend to avoid.  
We should point out that this somewhat unexpected result may be due to a bias in the corpus of literature 
we used for the meta-analysis, where we find an overrepresentation of mid- to high- skilled occupations. 
This is arguably due to the fact that the method used in the studies we considered, i.e.  correspondence 
testing, requires applications to be written. As we know, recruitment in the low skill segment of the 
labour market, instead, tends to be based on personal contacts and applications in person (Rebien 2010; 
Bonoli and Hinrichs 2012). This reduces the number of correspondence studies that focus on the low 
skill/low wage segment of the labour market13. 
We explain the observed result in terms of a (rational) preference given to candidates who have few 
alternatives. But are there other explanations? Often in the field of discrimination research rational 
choice explanations compete with psychological accounts based on the notion of stereotype and 
prejudice (e.g., Fiske, 1998). According to this view, the preference sometimes given to ethnic minority 
candidates might reflect the stereotypes and images employers have constructed. Typically, for low 
skilled undesirable jobs, it is more common to imagine a migrant from a recently arrived group than a 
member of the majority. This alternative explanation could account for instances of minority preference 
in the low skill segment of the labour market. However, it is more difficult to produce a stereotype-
based explanation for minority preference among higher skilled professionals, which, in our analysis, is 
the strongest effect.  
Another alternative explanation could refer to affirmative action policies in recruiting. One could 
hypothesise that firms where ethnic minorities are underrepresented but committed to increasing staff 
                                                          
13 We excluded audit studies because of the methodological problems linked to the difficulty of control for individual 
unobserved characteristics of the actors, who apply for the different positions, and in order to have a sample of estimates that 
is as homogenous as possible.  
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diversity, might prefer minority candidates. Our data does not allow us to test this hypothesis, and we 
acknowledge that it could contribute explaining the observed pattern.  
In sum, the curvilinear relationship between gross discrimination and minority preference that we have 
identified, in our view is best explained by the model we developed, which claims that the preference 
given to minority candidates is due to the fact that these have fewer alternatives in the labour market. 
These workers are more likely to be loyal and according to efficiency wage theory, more productive at 
any wage level.  
 
7) Conclusion 
The correspondence testing literature has consistently treated tests in which only the minority candidate 
is called back as a randomly distributed outcome that does not require explanation. We demonstrated 
that minority preference is related to gross discrimination and more frequent among high skilled 
professionals. This means that the assumption of random distribution regarding minority preference is 
inadequate.  
What then, if not chance, explains the distribution of instances of minority preference? We argued that 
the preference sometimes given to minority candidates can be explained by employers’ anticipation of 
them having fewer alternatives in the labour market. Our results are compatible with this account, 
however, the data we use does not allow us to test alternative hypothesis, such as for example the fact 
that companies who value diversity may intentionally prefer minority candidates if these are 
underrepresented or the fact that minority candidates are preferred because they conform to prevailing 
stereotypes.  
The finding that minority preference is not distributed randomly, however, has implications for research 
on discrimination. If minority preference is driven by the fact that members of the minority have fewer 
alternatives and are, for example, more likely to accept low quality employment, then it is questionable 
to subtract minority preference from the gross discrimination rate. In a way, both results refer to 
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(different) forms of discrimination. One leads to exclusion from the labour market, the other may lead 
to entrapment in low quality employment. 
The finding that minority preference is more prevalent among high skilled professionals is intriguing, 
and needs to be better understood. In general, we believe that our findings underscore the need for 
further research focusing on the determinants of minority preference, an outcome that has been almost 
entirely ignored in the quantitative literature so far.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1: Theoretical model of the relationship between minority preference and gross discrimination. 






































Table 1: Multilevel models of the minority preference rate 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Preference 
majority 
0.578** (0.170) 0.571* (0.212) 0.359* (0.151) 
Preference 
majority^2 
-0.625* (0.228) -0.625* (0.278) -0.326+ (0.167) 
Prestige score    0.001 (0.001)   
Managers 
(ref) 
      








    -0.015 (0.065) 
Services and 
sales workers 









    -0.118** (0.037) 
Elementary 
occupations 
    -0.122** (0.035) 
Constant  -0.028* (0.010) -0.088* (0.038) 0.092* (0.043) 
Log-
Likelihood 




134.71  125.86  130.42  
N 139  131  135  
Studies 15  15  15  
Standard errors in parentheses 






Table A1: Estimation details for European Social Survey 2010  
Data and sample 
We use data from the European Social Survey Round 5 for the year 2010 (ESS 2010).  
As most of the correspondence testings have been carried out in the US or in Western Europe, we run 
our analyses on a similar sample of countries. From the 27 countries we retain 12 Western European 
countries, namely, namely Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Great 
Britain, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.14  
 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is ‘How difficult/easy is it to get a similar or better job if you had to leave your 
current employer’ (variable smblvib). The answer is gauged on a scale between 0 ‘extremely difficult’ 
and 10 ‘extremely easy’, which we reverse meaning that high values correspond to difficulties finding 
an alternative position. 
 
Independent variable 
To capture minority status, we use the variable dscrgrp which asks whether the respondent is member 
of a group that is discriminated against in the country of residence (yes/no).  
 
Control variables 
We control for age in years (agea), which we recode into six groups (less than 18, 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 
45-54, and 55-65 years), gender with reference category being male (gndr), a continuous variable 
capturing the number of members living in the household (hhmmb), and citizenship distinguishing 
between foreigner and national (ctzcntr). We use the International Standard Classification of Education 
(ISCED) to capture educational outcome (eisced) and control for the income decile (hinct). 
To control for underemployment as a determinant of the wish to change employer, we include a measure 
of the hours a person would chose to work weekly if he/she could choose (‘How many hours would you 
choose to work weekly’, wkhsch). 
To control for difficulties finding other employment due to health-related issues, we control for the 
subjective assessment of a person’s health (health) gauged on a scale from very good (=1) to very bad 
(=5). 
Moreover, we control for firmsize (estsz) distinguishing very small (<10), small (10-24), medium (25-
99), large (100-500) and very large firms (<500). We capture the sector of employment using the 1-digit 
ISCO-88 classification that distinguishes between managers, professionals, technicians and associate 
professionals, clerks, service workers and shop and market sales workers, skilled agricultural and fishery 
workers, craft and related trade workers, plant and machine operators and assemblers, elementary 
occupations, and armed forces.  
 
Estimation 
To account for the nested data structure we run multilevel models, however, as we have only 12 higher 




We replicate these analyses also with EES 02 data for 2004 (ESS 2004) which has a different country 
sample and a slightly different dependent variable. The countries included are Austria, Belgium, 
Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Finland, Great Britain, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, and Sweden. The dependent variable asks ‘How easy/difficult is it to get a similar or better job 
with another employer’.  The results are robust with these data (results not shown but available upon 
request).  
                                                          
14 We exclude Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Croatia, Israel, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, 






Table A2: Determinants of perceived job alternatives  






0.417** (0.135) 0.398** (0.138) 0.377** (0.137) 0.448*** (0.110) 
Gender 
(ref. male) 
-0.009 (0.072) -0.001 (0.085) -0.005 (0.082) -0.035 (0.082) 
Age >18 
years (ref.) 
        
18-24 
years 
-0.421 (0.616) -0.515 (0.591) -0.591 (0.591) -1.291*** (0.381) 
25-34 
years 
-0.411 (0.553) -0.505 (0.532) -0.572 (0.531) -1.326*** (0.381) 
35-44 
years 
-0.212 (0.567) -0.290 (0.548) -0.372 (0.546) -1.121** (0.432) 
45-54 
years 
0.311 (0.553) 0.232 (0.538) 0.130 (0.536) -0.615 (0.437) 
55-65 
years  




        
ISCED 
level 2 
-0.102 (0.161) -0.130 (0.161) -0.099 (0.167) -0.172 (0.177) 
ISCED 
level 3a 
-0.162 (0.169) -0.175 (0.156) -0.135 (0.157) -0.168 (0.170) 
ISCED 
level 3b 
-0.188 (0.192) -0.183 (0.167) -0.137 (0.163) -0.201 (0.210) 
ISCED 
level 4 
-0.398* (0.181) -0.346* (0.161) -0.298 (0.156) -0.378* (0.189) 
ISCED 
level 5a 
-0.583*** (0.175) -0.463** (0.161) -0.408** (0.155) -0.507** (0.164) 
ISCED 
level 5b 




        
Managers    -0.364 (0.593) -0.398 (0.590) -0.016 (0.628) 
Profession
als 
  -0.107 (0.662) -0.143 (0.657) 0.183 (0.684) 
Technician
s 
  0.010 (0.595) -0.030 (0.591) 0.278 (0.620) 
Clerks   0.456 (0.565) 0.401 (0.564) 0.686 (0.607) 
Service   -0.061 (0.578) -0.113 (0.576) 0.143 (0.624) 
Agricultur
e 
  -0.000 (0.570) -0.050 (0.565) 0.221 (0.623) 
Craft   0.061 (0.562) 0.011 (0.560) 0.311 (0.637) 
Plant 
operators 




  -0.019 (0.623) -0.098 (0.611) 0.155 (0.636) 
Health      0.154*** (0.026) 0.155*** (0.029) 




      0.017 (0.021) 
Firm <10         
Firm 10-24       0.169 (0.121) 
Firm 25-99       0.148 (0.128) 
100-499       0.351** (0.127) 
>500       0.482*** (0.136) 
Unlimited 
work 







      0.090 (0.111) 
No 
contract  




      -0.001 (0.004) 
Income 
decile  
      -0.056*** (0.009) 








0.465 0.181 0.465 0 .187 0.463 0.196 0.435 0.192 
ll -20353.69  -20204.52  -20177.79  -17389.35  
AIC 40729.38  40431.04  40377.59  34800.70  




8503  8454  8448  7403  
Countries 12  12  12  12  
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table S4: Estimations with extended dataset 







Constant  -0.003 (0.013) 
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Figure S2: Majority and minority preference in the extended sample 
 
 
